Young infants' successful performance on false belief tasks has led several researchers to argue that there may be a core knowledge system for representing the beliefs of other agents, emerging early in human development and constraining automatic belief processing into adulthood. One way to investigate this purported core belief representation system is to examine whether non-human primates share such a system. Although non-human primates have historically performed poorly on false belief tasks that require executive function capacities, little work has explored how primates perform on more automatic measures of belief processing. To get at this issue, we modified Kovács et al. (2010)'s test of automatic belief representation to examine whether one non-human primate speciesthe rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta)-is automatically influenced by another agent's beliefs when tracking an object's location. Monkeys saw an event in which a human agent watched an apple move back and forth between two boxes and an outcome in which one box was revealed to be empty. By occluding segments of the apple's movement from either the monkey or the agent, we manipulated both the monkeys' belief (true or false) and agent's belief (true or false) about the final location of the apple. We found that monkeys looked longer at events that violated their own beliefs than at events that were consistent with their beliefs. In contrast to human infants, however, monkeys' expectations were not influenced by another agent's beliefs, suggesting that belief representation may be an aspect of core knowledge unique to humans.
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Introduction
People understand other agents' behaviors not only in terms of their superficial physical properties, but also as the result of a rich repertoire of unobservable mental states. Much debate in developmental psychology has focused on the problem of how we acquire the ability to represent such unobservable mental states, and how we come to recognize that these mental states can be different from our own. Although early research suggested that children begin to represent others' false beliefs only around four years of age (see reviews in Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 ), more recent work demonstrates that infants show some understanding of others' false beliefs even in the first two years of life (e.g., Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2012; Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Luo, 2011; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Poulin-Dubois & Chow, 2009; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Scott, Baillargeon, Song, & Leslie, 2010; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Song, Onishi, Baillargeon, & Fisher, 2008; Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007; Surian & Geraci, 2012) . In a landmark paper, Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) observed that 15-month-old infants look longer when an agent with a false belief searches for an object in its true location than when the agent searches in the spot where she saw it last (see also Surian et al., 2007) . Infants around this age are also able to take false beliefs into account when inferring an agent's preferences
